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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1977, the Contractual Mistakes Act was passed. It was a measure 
intended to reform the law relating to the effects of mistakes on 
contracts.Cl) The Act confers on the courts wide powers to grant relief in 
certain cases where one or more of the parties has entered into a contract 
under the influence of a mistake. 
Conlon v. Ozolins<2) represents the first consideration of the Act by the 
Court of Appeal. The parties had entered into a contract, which although 
1<1as expressed in clear and unambiguous language, represented the true 
intentions of one of the parties only. The Court of Appeal held that the 
mistaken party, Mrs Ozolins, was able to be granted relief under the 
Contractual Mistakes Act, even though the other party, Mr Conlon, had been 
unaware of her error. The Court's decision is of considerable importance 
to the law of contract. The Court made a more than surprising use of the 
provisions of the legislation in order to enable relief to be available, 
and in so doing, effected a major change in both the analysis and result of 
cases of the type involved in Conlon v. Ozolins.(3) It will be my 
submission that the Court of Appeal's decision is contrary to the 
intentions of both the Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee, which 
was initially responsible for the legislation, and of Parliament itself. 
II. CONLON V. OZOLINS - THE FACTS 
Mrs Ozolins, the defendant, was an elderly widow who owned some land in 
Palmerston North. The land was contained in two certificates of title. 
One certificate of title had been issued in respect of the section upon 
which the defendant's house had been built. This land had a street 
frontage. The rest of her land, almost an acre in area, had been 
sub-divided into four lots and was contained in a separate certificate of 
title. These four lots were back sections and ran parallel to the street, 
forming an 'L' shape with the house section. Lot four shared a common 
boundary with the house section and had been developed as the defendant's 
garden. Visually it was a continuation of the house property. It was 
' .. ' t :-- =~~ .. ;_ :-: . . . i. 
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separated by a large fence from lots one to three, which had remained 
undeveloped. 
In December 1981, the plaintiff, Mr Conlon, approached the defendant and 
inquired about the possible sale of her extra land. Mrs Ozolins, who 
desired to sell the paddock area, lots one to three, mentioned a price of 
$45,000 and referred Mr Conlon to her solicitor.(4) The solicitor, 
however, had never been to the properties and failed to appreciate that 
when his client spoke of selling 11 the land at the back 11 ,(5) she was 
referring only to the paddock area, and not to all of her back land, which 
included her garden area as well. The solicitor produced for the 
plaintiff, the certificate of title for the four lots as showing the land 
for sale. As a result, Mr Conlon assumed Mrs Ozolins' intention was to 
sell all of that land. 
The parties settled upon a price of $42,000, and an agreement for the sale 
and purchase of the four lots was drawn up by the defendant's solicitor. 
Before the defendant signed the agreement, her solicitor opened out the 
certificate of title for the four lots and asked her what she was selling. 
She immediately replied, 11 Not my home.(6) The contract was then signed by 
both parties. 
The defendant later discovered that by mistake, she had contracted to sell 
all of the back land, including of course, her garden. She refused to 
complete the transfer. The purchaser, Mr Conlon, then brought a suit for 
the specific performance of the contract. 
III. RELIEF UNDER THE COMMON LAW AND EQUITY 
Under the law as it existed prior to the enactment of the Contractual 
Mistakes Act, Mrs Ozolins would have been most unlikely to have been 
granted any relief from the obligations which she had mistakenly 
undertaken. Even though she and Mr Conlon had been at cross-purposes in 
respect of the subject matter of the contract and therefore were not in a 
state of true consensus, it is likely that the courts would have held her 
to the apparent agreement evidenced by the written contract. The law 
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judged the parties not by what they had in their minds, but rather by what 
they had said and done. Blackburn J., in Smith v. Hughes(?) said (8): 
11 I apprehend that if one of the parties intends to make a contract 
on one set of terms, and the other intends to make a contract on 
another set of terms, or as it is sometimes expressed, if the 
parties are not ad idem, there is no contract unless the 
circumstances are such as to preclude one of the parties from 
denying that he has agreed to the terms of the other. The rule of 
law is that stated in Freeman v. Cooke 2 Ex at p.633. If, whatever 
a man's real intention may be, he so conducts himself that a 
reasonable man would believe that he was assenting to the terms 
proposed by the other party, and that other party upon that belief 
enters into the contract with him, the man thus conducting himself 
would be equally bound as if he had intended to agree to the other 
party's terms." 
There were, however, three situations in which relief was possible 
notwithstanding the existence of an apparent agreement. One was where the 
apparent agreement was in fact ambiguous, so that it was not possible to 
determine just what was the subject matter of the contract.(9) The second 
was where the mistake made by one party was known to the other party, and 
that party had been involved in sharp practice in relation to that 
mistake.(10) The third was where the party seeking to enforce a contract 
had, by his negligence, caused or contributed to cause the mistake.(11) 
Mrs Ozolins would have been unable to avail herself of any of these three 
exceptions. The contract which she had signed was unambiguous. It gave 
rise to one interpretation only - that all four lots were to be sold. Mr 
Conlon had been unaware of Mrs Ozolins• mistake, and in no way had he 
caused or contributed to cause its occurrence. 
The only other possibility for relief was the withholding by the Court, of 
an order for the specific performance of the contract, leaving the other 
party to a claim for damages. This equitable discretion was only 
exercised where the granting of an order for specific performance would 
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have resulted in undue hardship being suffered by the mistaken 
party,(12) although in considering the question of hardship, courts also 
had regard to any hardship which might have been suffered by the other 
party if the order was refused.(13) 
The equitable discretion to withhold a decree for specific performance has 
been left untouched by the Contractual Mistakes Act.(14) It is still 
available, notwithstanding any lack of jurisdiction to grant relief under 
the Act itself. As a result, its possible exercise was considered by both 
Greig J. in the High Court, and Somers J. in the Court of Appeal. However, 
both judges refused to exercise their discretion, holding that although 
Mrs Ozolins would suffer hardship in losing her garden and in having to 
change her mode of living,(15) the fact remained that she was the one 
responsible for the mistake, and a refusal to grant the decree would result 
in a hardship to the plaintiff, who had entered into another transaction 
relying on his ability to purchase all of the four lots.(16) This matter 
was not considered by Woodhouse P. or McMullin J. in the Court of Appeal. 
IV. THE CONTRACTUAL MISTAKES ACT 1977 
The Contractual Mistakes Act was enacted in 1977 following a report by the 
Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee.(17) The Act was intended to 
remedy the perceived defects of the existing law. Criticisms which were 
made about the law included allegations that it consisted of "a fragmented 
series of doctrines 11 ,(l8) and that it relied on tests for mistake which 
were "inherently meaningless 11 .09) Furthermore, the law was criticised as 
having difficulty coping with the concept of negligence,(20) and the 
doctrinal differences between the Common Law and Equity were regarded as 
unsatisfactory.(21) The biggest criticism however, was that the remedies 
available under the law were "drastic and inflexible.(22) The Contracts 
and Commercial Law Reform Committee annexed a draft Bill to its report. 
This Bill formed the basis of the Contractual Mistakes Act.(23) 
For most purposes the Act was intended to be a code. Section 5(1) 
provides: 
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11 Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, this Act shall 
have effect in place of the rules of the common law and of equity 
governing the circumstances in which relief may be granted, on the 
grounds of mistake, to a party to a contract or to a person claiming 
through or under such party. 11 
Section 5(2) provides that: 
11 Nothing in this Act shall affect -
(a) The doctrine of non est factum;(24) 
(b) The law relating to the rectification of contracts; 
(c) The law relating to fraud ..• or misrepresentation, 
whether fraudulent or innocent; 
II 
As previously mentioned, section 5(3) preserves the equitable discretion of 
the courts to withhold a decree of specific performance. 
Section 6 sets out the circumstances which are required to exist before 
relief can be granted under the Act. The pertinent provisions of this 
section state that: 
11 (1) A Court may in the course of any proceedings or on 
application made for the purpose grant relief under section 7 
of this Act to any party to a contract -
(a) If in entering into that contract -
(i) That party was influenced in his decision to enter 
into the contract by a mistake that was material to 
him, and the existence of the mistake was known to 
the other party •.. ; or 
(ii) All the parties to the contract were influenced in 
their respective decisions to enter into the 
contract by the same mistake; or 
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(iii) That party and at least one other party (not being 
a party having substantially the same interest 
under the contract as the party seeking relief) 
were each influenced in their respective decisions 
to enter into the contract by a different mistake 
about the same matter of fact or of law; and 
(b) The mistake or mistakes, as the case may be, resulted at 
the time of the contract -
(i) In a substantially unequal exchange of values; or 
(ii) In the conferment of a benefit, or in the 
imposition or inclusion of an obligation, which 
was, in all the circumstances, a benefit or 
obligation substantially disproportionate to the 
consideration therefor;" 
Section 2(1) provides that a "mistake" can be of law or of fact, and 
section 2(3) states that: 
"There is a contract for the purposes of this Act where a contract 
would have come into existence but for circumstances of the kind 
described in section 6(1)(a) of this Act." 
This provision was included in the Act to deal with the possible argument 
that a mistake resulted in there being no contract, and therefore relief is 
not possible under the Act, because section 6 requires the existence of a 
contract. 
The relief which may be granted under the Act is dealt with by section 7. 
The Act confers on the courts a discretion to grant that relief which it 
thinks just in all the circumstances of a case. Section 4(2) provides, 
however, that the powers to grant relief under Section 7, in the 
circumstances mentioned in section 6: 
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II are not to be exercised in such a way as to prejudice the 
general security of contractual relationships. 11 
This provision was inserted into the Contractual Mistakes Bill by the 
Select Committee after concern about contractual certainty and security had 
been expressed. 
v. 
A. 
THE APPLICATION OF THE ACT IN CONLON V. OZOLINS 
The Smith v. Hughes Principle: 
In the High Court, Greig J. held that the Smith v. Hughes(25) 
principle operated to prevent Mrs Ozolins from being able to obtain 
any relief under the Act. His Honour adopted the approach taken by 
Mahon J. in McCullough v. McGrath's Stock & Poultry Ltd.(26) In that 
case, McGrath, a governing director of the defendant company, had 
contracted to purchase four allotments of farm land. He refused to 
complete the transaction when he later discovered that the property 
was comprised within three certificates of title and not four, as he 
had originally been told by the vendor. The contract had correctly 
described the land as being comprised within three certificates of 
title. The vendor, but not the purchaser, knew this. Mahon J. held 
that the defendant was estopped from asserting that he was 
influenced in his decision to enter into the contract by a mistake. 
The defendant was estopped from contending that he did not correctly 
appreciate the particulars of the contract.(27) Mahon J., with whom 
Greig J. concurred, said the Smith v. Hughes(28) principle could be 
applied notwithstanding the enactment of the Contractual Mistakes 
Act 1977. <'.' His Honour said that although in section 5(1) of the Act 
the legislature had codified the circumstances in which relief could 
be granted on proof of mistake, it has not touched upon the question 
as to the manner of providi..llil-1.he existence of mistake or the 
circumstances from which the exi~tence of mistake could be inferred 
either factually or as a matter of law. The Smith v. 
Hughes(29) principle was said to operate only upon the question of 
whether mistake in fact existed, and its operation was therefore not 
excluded by anything within section 5 of the Act.(30) 
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In the Court of Appeal, Greig J's judgment was set aside. ~The 
majority, comprised of Woodhouse P. and McMullin J., held that the 
requirements of section 6(1)(a) had been satisfied~ thus enabling 
relief to be granted under the Act. )' The Smith v. Hughes(31) 
principle was said to be no longer a bar to relief, and the facts of 
the case were held to be within the particular wording of section 
6(l)(a)(iii).(32) 
In respect of the Smith v. Hughes(33) principle, McMullin J., with 
whom Woodhouse P. concurred, said:(34) 
II there is nothing in the Contractual Mistakes Act nor the 
report of the committee to support the view taken by Mahon J. 
which, if adopted, would -severely restrict the operation of 
the Act itself. In enacting the Contractual Mistakes Act 
Parliament provided an entirely new code applicable to every 
case of mistake which fitted within its framework. It 
replaced with its own provisions the old and unsatisfactory 
rules of the common law and those others which equity had 
evolved in an endeavour to mitigate the harshness of the 
former. Thus a person who is a party to a contract, to which 
some element of mistake attaches, must now look to the 
statute and no longer to the common law or equity for his 
remedy, if there is to be one. To hold that the Smith v. 
Hughes principle still operates to defeat the application of 
the Act would be to deprive the statute of much of its force; 
it would ignore the very wording of s.5(1) which expressly 
says that the Act shall have effect in place of the rules of 
the common law and of equity governing the circumstances in 
which relief may be granted on the grounds of mistake. 
Therefore, in so far as it holds that the operation of 
estoppel by representation is not excluded by the Contractual 
Mistakes Act, McCullough v. McGrath was wrongly decided. It 
should not now stand in the way of the appellant." 
The majority, in so far as it held that a party is not prevented 
from asserting that a mistake was made, must be correct. The 
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approach of Mahon J. in McCullough v. McGrath,(35) and of Greig J. 
in the High Court, resulted in mistake cases being decided outside 
of the provisions of the legislation which was enacted to deal with 
those cases. The Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee in 
its report on the law of mistake, said that one of the objects of 
their proposed law reform was to amalgamate the then fragmented 
doctrines of mistake into one single body of law.(36) Yet an effect 
of Mahon and Greig J.J. •s approach was that there were two bodies of 
law for cases in which a mistake had been made: one in which the 
mistake was able to be raised, and another in which the mistaken 
party was estopped from asserting the mistake. 
However, it would be going too far to hold that since the enactment 
of the Contractual Mistakes Act 1977, there is no room in the law of 
contract for the parties to ever be judged by what they had said and 
done, rather than by what they intended. This is of considerable 
importance in the area of contract formation, in which the courts 
have on previous occasions, assessed the words and conduct of the 
parties to an alleged contract, in order to determine whether that 
contract was in fact made.(37) The continuance of such an objective 
assessment in this area, was recognised by Somers J. in the Court of 
Appeal. His Honour said:(38) 
11 The declaration in s.5 and the provisions of s.2(3) suggest 
that Parliament has assumed that s.6(l)(a) includes all cases 
in which common law mistake would prevent a contract coming 
into existence at all. But that case aside the normal 
principles under which the existence of a contract is to be 
determined are not affected by the Act. One such principle 
is that a party may not be allowed by reason of his conduct 
to deny his apparent assent to a contract or a term thereof: 
eg Wood v. Scarth (1858)1 F & F 293. He is estopped from 
denying the objective phenomenon of agreement. That is what 
I understood Blackburn J. to have meant in Smith v. Hughes 
(187l)LR 6QB 597, 607 when he referred to Baron Parke's 
statement about estoppel in Freeman v. Cooke (1848)2 Exch 654 
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(itself a case of trover). It is not easy to envisage the 
case of a party estopped from disputing his assent to a 
contract yet successfully able to urge some mistake about 
that inferred assent to which the Act can apply and in 
respect of which relief should be given." 
His Honour continued:(39) 
"But there is no need to resort to the course of negotiation 
in the present case for it resulted in a written contract in 
which the agreement is apparent from the words used. They 
exhibit no ambiguity of any description. Indeed before the 
Act the vendor in the instant case could, as I think, have 
had no relief in mistake. Her intention is discoverable from 
the words of the contract. Her error was truly 'unilateral 1 
- it was unknown to the purchaser .•.• That circumstance 
however can provide no guide to the construction of an Act 
intended to reform the law. It would itself be a mistake to 
approach the provisions of the Contractual Mistakes Act in 
general and s.6(l)(a) in particular influenced by the rules 
of law which operated before its enactment. A new start is 
called for." 
Somers J. views the Smith v. Hughes(40) principle as requiring an 
objective assessment to be made of the words and conduct of the 
parties to an alleged contract, in order to determine whether that 
contract had in fact been made. His Honour sees the principle as 
operating to prevent a party, not from claiming that a mistake has 
been made, but from denying that a contract has been created. 
Somers J. said that it was not necessary to assess the words and 
conduct of Mrs Ozolins and Mr Conlon, because their intentions to 
contract and the terms of their contract could be ascertained from 
their written agreement. 
His Honour states that it is difficult to see how a party could 
receive relief under the Act, if that party has been prevented from 
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denying his assent to a contract, by the operation of the principle. 
If a party has attempted to deny an intention to make any contract, 
it is certainly difficult to see how that party could get relief. 
Section 6(l)(a) requires the party seeking relief to show, amongst 
other things, that he was influenced in his decision to enter a 
contract by a mistake.(41) This necessarily involves showing an 
intention to contract, as such an intention is inherent in the 
decision taken to enter the contract. Yet, such an intention had 
previously been denied. In the case where a party seeking relief 
has intended to make a contract, but not on the terms of the 
apparent agreement, the question of whether that party could get 
relief under the Act, but be prevented from denying his assent to 
the apparent agreement, depends on the use of section 6(l)(a)(iii) 
by the courts. ~Under the Common Law, the Smith v. Hughes (42) 
principle did not operate if the party against whom relief was 
sought, either knew of the mistake at the time the contract was made, 
or had shared that mistake. These 'exceptions' are reproduced in 
section 6(1)(a) in subparagraphs (i) and (ii). Had the use of 
section 6(1)(a)(iii) been limited to situations, which under the 
Common Law would also have attracted an exception to the principle, 
it would indeed be difficult to see how a party could get relief 
under the Act, yet also be prevented from denying his assent to a 
contract. It would also not affect the result of any case whether 
the Smith v. Hughes(43) principle operated to prev~nt a party from 
asserting a mistake, as opposed to preventing that party from 
denying his assent to the contract. However, because of the wide 
use of section 6(l)(a)(iii) made by the majority in Conlon v. 
Ozolins,(44) Somers J. dissenting, it would be possible for a party 
to be prevented from denying his assent to a contract, yet able to 
be granted relief under the Act. The majority had used this 
provision in order to enable relief to be available, whereas under 
the Common Law, Mrs Ozolins would have been held to the contract, 
because when viewed objectively, she was in agreement with Mr 
Conlon, and no exceptions to the objective principle applied. This 
wide use of section 6(l)(a)(iii) means that a different result could 
be achieved in a case, if the Smith v. Hughes(45) principle 
B. 
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prevented a party from raising a mistake. Thus, it was important 
for the majority to overrule Mahon and Greig J.J 1 s use of the 
principle, in order for them to enable relief to be available. 
~The majority said that in so far as McCullough v. McGrath(46) held 
that the Smith v. Hughes(47) principle was not excluded by the 
Contractual Mistakes Act, it was wrongly decided.,48) The principle 
must not, however, be totally eliminated from the law of contract by 
the majority judgments. The principle can, and surely must survive 
the enactment of the Act in so far as it provides the objective 
tests of contract formation, as was recognised by Somers J. This 
application of the principle does not interfere with the ability of 
the courts to entertain applications for relief under the Act, 
because it is concerned with ascertaining whether there is a 
contract in any given sense. This must be done before the effect of 
a mistake in respect of that contract can be assessed. The majority 
Judges did not consider the wider applications of the Smith v. 
Hughes(49) principle, so their apparent overruling of it should be 
limited to what they did consider - whether a party could be 
prevented from asserting a mistake, when there were no reasonable 
grounds for having made that mistake and when the other party was 
unaware of the error. 
The Satisfaction of Section 6(l)(a)(iii) 
Each of the three Courts of Appeal judges continued on to examine 
whether the facts of Conlon v. Ozolins(50) came within the 
particular wording of section 6(l)(a)(iii). This provision requires 
that each party must have been influenced in their respective 
decisions to enter into the contract by a different mistake about 
the same matter of fact or of law. It had been accepted that if Mrs 
Ozolins was to be able to receive relief under the Act, the case had 
to satisfy section 6(l)(a)(iii), as Mr Conlon had not known of her 
mistake,(51) and nor had he made it himself.(52) 
The majority of the Court of Appeal, comprising of Woodhouse P. and 
McMullin J., held that the requirements of subparagraph (iii) had 
been satisfied. Woodhouse P. said:(53) 
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II there can be no doubt that each then mistakenly believed 
that the written document correctly represented a mutual 
intention which did not exist. He mistakenly thought she was 
consciously selling all of the land at the rear of her house 
including the garden; she mistakenly thought he was buying 
merely the land beyond the high fence. To put the matter in 
another way, each had a mistaken impression about the 
boundaries of the tract of land being bought and sold. Mr 
Conlon believed from the outset the vendor had been willing 
to complete a sale of all four lots: about that he was 
mistaken. On the other hand she believed he had limited his 
purchase to the land north of the fence: about that she was 
mistaken. It is an analysis which shows that their 
respective decisions to proceed and finally to enter into the 
written contract were influenced by a mistaken belief on the 
one side that was different from the mistaken belief on the 
other and also that each mistake was about the size of land 
to be bought and sold." 
Similarly, McMullin J. said:(54) 
"The present case comes within s6(1)(a)(iii) .••.. The 
appellant's mistake was in thinking, as Greig J. found, that 
she was selling only lots 1 to 3; the respondent's in 
thinking that the appellant intended to sell lots 1 to 4." 
Somers J., on the other hand, held that the case did not fall within 
the terms of the provision at all. He said:(55) 
"It is clear that the vendor was influenced in her decision 
to enter the contract by mistakenly thinking the land 
described in the contract did not include the rear portion of 
what she called her home. In substance her mistake concerned 
the subject matter of the contract. It can be expressed in 
different ways - she mistook the legal description in the 
agreement; she mistakenly sold four lots instead of three. 
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The next question is what different mistake about the same 
matter of fact - the subject matter of the contract - did the 
purchaser make? It was submitted that he mistakenly supposed 
the vendor intended to sell that which she did not. 
That posited mistake of the purchaser too can be put in 
different ways - he mistakenly supposed the vendor meant what 
she said in the contract; he mistakenly supposed her to be 
intending to sell four lots. But however put it is in the 
end a suggested mistake about the vendor's state of mind. 
That is no doubt a matter of fact but it can hardly be 
described as the same matter of fact about which the vendor 
was mistaken. Her mistake was as to the subject matter of 
the sale." 
His Honour continued:(56) 
"But there is a more fundamental difficulty. I do not 
consider that in ordinary parlance it can be said that the 
purchaser made any mistake at all. He intended to buy the 
four lots described to and inspected by him, and that, 
according to the agreement, is what he did." 
In addition to his finding that the case did not fall within the 
literal wording of section 6(l)(a)(iii), Somers J. also concluded 
that the case was not one which Parliament had intended to be 
covered by that provision. He said:(57) 
"The instant case is one which Parliament intended to be met 
only if the purchaser knew of the vendor's mistake - that is 
to say if the case fell within s6(1)(a)(i). If the 
purchaser's postulated mistake - namely that he erroneously 
thought the vendor intended to sell him all four lots - is 
sufficient to bring the case within subpara (iii), there will 
be few, if any, cases of mistaken intent not falling within 
the Act. For as often as one party is mistaken in intention 
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the other party will be taken to be relevantly differently 
mistaken about the same matter of fact so as to bring the 
case within subpara (iii). I do not consider this can have 
been the legislative purpose. If it were subpara (i) which 
requires knowledge by one party of the mistake of the other 
seems superfluous. 11 
His Honour concluded with a defence of his dissent, by saying:(58) 
11 If this should seem a restrictive approach it must be 
recalled that mistake involves an area in which the law prior 
to the Act, and Parliament in the Act, has had to balance the 
injustice of committing a party to a contract he did not 
intend to make and the commercial expectation of security of 
contract which has received special mention in s4(2). 11 
In holding that the facts of Conlon v. Ozolins<59) satisfied the 
requirements of section 6(1)(a)(iii), the majority effected a major 
departure from the previous law in both the analysis and result of 
cases in which a contract has been made, but representing the true 
intentions of only one of the parties. Previously, in the absence 
of knowledge of one party's mistake by the other party, relief was 
only possible if the court chose to exercise its equitable 
discretion to withhold a decree of specific performance, leaving the 
party seeking to enforce the contract, to his remedy in damages. 
Now, as a result of the decision in Conlon v. Ozolins(60), not only 
is that avenue available, but so is the possibility of relief under 
section 7 of the Act. 
As is apparent from the dissent of Somers J., there are difficulties 
in accepting that the particular wording of section 6(1)(a)(iii) has 
been met. It is certainly an unusual and surprising analysis of the 
facts to hold that Mr Conlon made a mistake. Even if it is accepted 
that his supposed mistake was made, there still remains the question 
of whether that mistake was in respect of the same matter as her 
mistake was. As has been seen, Somers J. said that it was not, and 
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Woodhouse P. said that it was. McMullin J. did not even address the 
issue. 
Whether the respective mistakes of Mrs Ozolins and Mr Conlon were 
about the same matter of fact depends on how those mistakes are 
analysed. Certainly, her mistake was in respect of the subject 
matter of the contract, the boundaries of the land being bought and 
sold. His 'mistake' was about her state of mind. To take a narrow 
approach, as was done by Somers J., the two mistakes are not about 
the same matter, and therefore, the requirements of section 
6(l)(a)(iii) are not satisfied. However, under a more liberal 
analysis, the two mistakes can be said to be about the same matter 
of fact, in this case, the subject matter of the contract. 
Notwithstanding that Mr Conlon's mistake is initially about Mrs 
Ozolins' state of mind, he mistook her mind in respect of the 
boundaries of the land to be bought and sold. Hence, his mistake 
can be tied in with her mistake, and the section 6(l)(a)(iii) 
requirement can be analysed as being met. 
Section 6(l)(a)(iii) also requires that each party must have been 
influenced in their respective decisions to enter into the contract 
by their respective mistakes. This requirement was not dealt with 
at any length by the judges in Conlon v. Ozolins(61). This may have 
been because only a relatively low standard has been set in respect 
of it. Prichard J. in Ware v. Johnson(62) said: 
11 [It] means no more than that both parties must necessarily 
have mistakenly accepted in their minds the existence of some 
fact which affects to a material degree the worth of the 
consideration given by one of the parties." 
All that was said in respect of this requirement in Conlon v. 
Ozolins(63), was by Woodhouse P., who, after stating the mistakes 
made by each party, said that the subparagraph (iii) requirements 
had been satisfied. Obviously this requirement is not going to be 
regarded as particularly difficult to meet.(64) 
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Notwithstanding the difficulties in bringing the facts of Conlon v. 
Ozolins(65) within the wording of section 6(l)(a)(iii), the majority 
found that the requirements of the provision were satisfied. In 
reaching this conclusion, the majority adopted a very liberal 
approach to the legislation. Indeed, Woodhouse P. went as far as to 
say: (66) 
11 in my view the case provides a classical example of one 
of the situations which is intended to fall within the 
remedial words of s.6(1)(a)(iii). 11 
His Honour continued:(67) 
11 The provision being remedial does not deserve to be 
construed narrowly or by reference to any of the rather mixed 
judicial conclusions based upon the common law. Instead, in 
accord with the Acts Interpretation Act 1924 the language 
must •receive such fair, large and liberal interpretation as 
will best ensure the attainment of the object of the Act and 
of such provision or enactment according to its true intent, 
meaning, and spirit'. I am satisfied the object of the 
Contractual Mistakes Act is promoted by construing it to 
include the present case. 11 
However, with respect, I submit that the use of section 6(l)(a)(iii) 
by the majority was not in accordance with the intentions of those 
responsible for the legislation, and therefore the facts of Conlon 
v. Ozolins(68) do not provide a 'classical example' of a 
subparagraph (iii) situation at all. It is my submission that in 
cases, such as Conlon v. Ozolins(69), where there is an unambiguous 
contract which correctly represents the true intentions of only one 
of the parties, relief under the Act was only intended to be 
available if the error of the mistaken party was known to the other 
party at the time the contract was made. 
The Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee thought it should 
be essential to operative mistake that either:(70) 
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11 (i) the mistake was made by one party, and known to the 
other; or 
(ii) the mistake was made by both parties; or 
(iii)the mistake was in respect of a particular matter 
on which one party entertained one belief, and the other 
party entertained another. 11 
In the ensuing explanation, the Law Reform Committee gave the case 
of Raffles v. Wichelhaus< 71 ) as an example of parties having 
different beliefs in their minds about the same subject. In that 
case, the parties had agreed to buy and sell a consignment of cotton 
sailing 11 ex Peerless from Bombay 11 • Unknown to the parties, there 
were two ships meeting that description, and each party had a 
different ship in mind. Because of the ambiguity in the 
description, the Court was unable to determine which ship was 
referred to in the contract. As a consequence, the Court held that 
no binding agreement had been made. The Law Reform Committee said 
that the Raffles v. Wichelhaus< 72) situation should be covered by 
any new legislation.(73) 
Gilmore< 74) has argued that the case of Raffles v. 
Wichelhaus< 75) was wrongly analysed. He said that the identity of 
the ship carrying the tender of cotton was not a true condition of 
the contract. He said the mistake over the two ships did not relate 
to a fundamental aspect of the contract, as the law required for 
operative mistake.(76) Nevertheless, he gave the case of Kyle v. 
Kavanagh(77) as an alternative example of an ambiguous contract, in 
respect of which each party has adopted a different meaning. In 
that case, the parties had contracted for the sale and purchase of a 
section of land in 11 Prospect Street 11 , in Waltham. In the seller's 
action for the price, the buyer pleaded that there were two 
"Prospect Streets" in Waltham, and that each party intended to deal 
with different lots of land. The buyer's plea was accepted, and the 
court held that there was no contract.(78) 
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Both case examples involve a mistake in respect of a particular 
matter on which one party entertained one belief and the other party 
entertained another. However, in the proposed Bill annexed to the 
Law Reform Committee•s report, the wording of subparagraph (iii) was 
changed to cover •a different mistake by each party about the same 
matter of fact or law. 11 
There are difficulties in bringing the Raffles v. Wichelhaus( 79 ) and 
the Kyle v. Kavanagh(80) situations within the new wording. Finn 
has said:(81) 
11 Despite the particularity of the drafting, the criteria are 
not entirely free from difficulties. It is clear from the 
Report (para 19) that the Raffles v. Wichelhaus (1864)2 H & C 
906 situation is intended to be covered. But the Report 
(ibid) sees that case as being one of the parties having 1 ••• 
different beliefs in their minds about the same subject•. It 
is doubtful whether [sub]paragraph (iii) will cover that 
situation - since the case is often analysed as one where one 
of the parties must have had the correct ship in mind but the 
court could not decide which. If that is so, then one of the 
parties was right, and there cannot be a 1 different mistake 
about the same matter of fact or law 1 • 11 
The cases can be analysed as coming within the particular wording of 
subparagraph (iii) if each party is said to have made a mistake as 
to the intention of the other, in respect of the subject matter of 
the contract. Indeed, Raffles v. Wichelhaus(82) was analysed by 
Corbin(83) in such a way. He said:(84) 
11 In the famous case of the ships named Peerless, neither 
party made a mistake in expression; each one correctly 
described the ship that he meant to describe. The mistake 
that each one made was in believing that the other party 
intended to describe the same ship that he himself described. 
Here they were 1 mutually 1 mistaken, which means that both 
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were mistaken. Were these 'mutual' mistakes identical? Not 
quite, although they had common elements. Both parties 
believed that there was only one ship named Peerless sailing 
from Bombay, when in fact there were two; both believed that 
there was agreement in meaning, when in fact there was not. 
But, in believing that the other party meant the same ship as 
himself, they were making closely similar but not identical 
mistakes." 
As has been seen, this liberal approach to the requirement of 
section 6(1)(a)(iii) that the mistakes of the parties must be in 
respect of the same matter, was adopted by the majority in Conlon v. 
ozolins(86), but rejected by Somers J. in his dissent. It is 
apparent from the problems with bringing the Raffles v. 
Wichelhaus(86) and Kyle v. Kavanagh(87) situations within the terms 
of the legislation, that this wider approach may be necessary if 
section 6(l)(a)(iii) is to cover cases which it was intended to 
cover. That is, cases involving a contract which admits of two 
meanings, and where each party had a different meaning in mind. 
However, the use of subparagraph (iii) is not limited to cases which 
involve an ambiguous contract. For example, Sutton(88) said that if 
two parties contract to buy and sell a Commer truck, but one party 
thinks the truck is a Datsun, while the other thinks it is a 
Leyland, then section 6(l)(a)(iii) is satisfied. Clearly, this is 
correct. Each party has made a different mistake in respect of the 
make of the truck. 
Even if it is accepted that the majority in Conlon v. 
Ozolins(89) properly dealt with the question of whether the supposed 
mistakes in that case were in respect of the same matter, it remains 
my submission that the use of subparagraph (iii) to cover the Conlon 
v. Ozolins(90) situation, was not in accordance with the intentions 
of those responsible for the legislation. It is my submission that 
for cases where there is a contract which, although unambiguous, 
represents the true intentions of only one of the parties, the 
intention was for those cases to be analysed as involving only one 
mistake, and that relief was to be unavailable unless the error of 
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the mistaken party was known to the other, at the time the contract 
was entered.(91) 
The legislation was drafted against the background of the Common 
Law, which treated such cases as involving only one mistake. For 
example, in Riverlate Properties Limited v. Pau1(92) a written lease 
expressed that any exterior and structural repairs were to be the 
liability of the landlord. This was in accordance with the 
understanding of the tenant, but not with that of the Landlord, who 
had intended the tenant to be proportionately liable for those 
repairs. Russell L.J., who delivered the judgment of the Court of 
Appeal, referred to the defendant tenant as having:(93) 
11 acquired a leasehold interest on terms upon which [she] 
intended to obtain it, and who thought when [she] obtained it 
that the lessor intended [her] to obtain it on those terms, ••. 11 
Yet, unlike Conlon v. Ozolins,(94) the case was dealt with as 
involving a mere unilateral mistake, and because there had been no 
knowledge of the landlord's mistake by the lessee, the landlord was 
not entitled to any relief.(95) 
Similarly, in Wallace v. McGirr,(96) the defendant, who was offered 
a house number six, carelessly inspected number sixteen. He signed 
a contract for the number six house, after reading the offer, but 
believing it to be for house number sixteen. The mistake had been 
wholly that of the defendant, and had not been known by the 
plaintiff. In these circumstances, the Court held the mistake to be 
purely unilateral, and because of the lack of knowledge, the 
defendant was bound.(97) 
A final example is the more recent case of Leighton v. Parton.(98) 
This case involved a contract for the sale and purchase of lot 
number five of a subdivision. The defendant contended that he had 
intended to deal with lot number four. Mahon J. said that the case 
involved a mere unilateral mistake, and because of the absence of 
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knowledge of that mistake, on the part of the plaintiff, no relief 
was possible. 
Indeed, it was recognised by Somers J. that under the previous law, 
Conlon v. Ozolins(99) would have been analysed as involving a 
unilateral mistake.(100) The majority, however, who held that the 
case involved two mistakes, and not just one, made it clear that 
they would not be influenced by the Common Law rules. McMullin J. 
said:(101) 
11 I see no reason to go outside the statute and return to 
the common law for a definition of operative mistake. One of 
the problems of the common law, as Professor Sutton and the 
Report pointed out, was in its definition and classification of 
mistake. The Contractual Mistakes Act is a remedial measure. 
As its long title indicates, it aims at a reform of the law. 
To construe it by reference to common law classifications would 
be to return to principles deliberately discarded because they 
were unsatisfactory. 11 
Woodhouse P. said section 6(l)(a)(iii), being remedial, was not to 
be construed by reference to any of what he termed the 11 rather mixed 
j u d i c i al con c l u s i on s bas e d u po n the common l a w . 11 (10 2 ) 
However with all due respect, the Common Law was clear, not mixed, 
in its classification and treatment of mistake cases, of which 
Conlon v. Ozolins<l03) is an example, where there existed an 
unambiguous contract representing the true intentions of only one of 
the parties. The report of the Law Reform Committee<l04) did not 
refer to the Common Law classifications of operative mistakes as 
either unilateral, common or mutual as unsatisfactory or a feature 
of the law which was intended to be changed. Notwithstanding 
Sutton's opinion that such classifications were a good guide through 
1 the maze of the common law•, but not a suitable inclusion in any 
statutory reform,(105) a classification system was adopted, and the 
categories appear to be based on those of the Common Law. It 
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appears that the main purpose of the legislation was to enable the 
courts to grant a wider range of relief measures and not to alter 
the jurisdiction of the courts to grant relief in what were regarded 
as unilateral mistake cases.(106) As Dukeson(l07) has argued, it is 
likely that the section 6(l)(a) categories of operative mistake were 
intended to parallel and not expand the traditional categories of 
mistake.(108) Sutton himself thought that the Contractual Mistakes 
Bill, as it was, did not extend the law in respect of unilateral 
mistake very much, if at a11.(109) Indeed, even the Chairman of the 
Statutes Revision Committee, the Honourable Mr Mclay, M.P. was of 
the opinion that no major change was proposed by the Bill in respect 
of the categories of mistake. He said:(110) 
II there are two distinct aspects of the Bill. The first is 
clearly nothing more than a codification, and that is the 
definition of 1 mistake 1 , but the clause that prescribes the new 
remedies - that will soften the effect of contractual mistake -
is new, and those are the remedies that the law reform 
committee recommended." 
In its report, the Law Reform Committee said that in cases involving 
mistakes made by one party only, relief should not be available 
under the proposed legislation unless the other party knew of that 
mistake.(111) Yet Conlon v. Ozolins(ll2) allows relief to be 
granted in cases which were previously seen as involving only one 
mistake, and which were intended to remain being analysed in such a 
way, even though the other party is unaware of the error. 
Furthermore, the Law Reform Committee said:(113) 
11 We also recognise that •operative mistake• is confined to 
that class of mistake which would justify a court in setting a 
contract aside and does not extend to that type of error which 
is less fundamental and merely justifies a court from 
withholding an order for specific performance." 
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Yet Conlon v. Ozolins<114) allows relief in cases where previously, 
because of the absence of knowledge, the only possible relief was 
the withholding of the decree for specific performance in accordance 
with the equitable discretion of the court. 
The Rt. Hon. Mr David Thomson, M.P., the then Minister of Justice 
and Minister responsible for the legislation, also emphasised the 
requirement of knowledge in unilateral mistake cases. He 
said:(115) 
"Clause [6] sets out the circumstances that must prevail before 
relief may be granted. A number of submissions did not appear 
to appreciate the mutuality concept of the clause - that is, 
that relief would be available only where the mistake was made 
by both parties, or made by one party and known to the other." 
Yet, as a result of the Court of Appeal's decision, the courts will 
have jurisdiction in terms of section 6(l)(a), to grant relief in 
almost every case before them. The only cases not covered are those 
involving a mistake by one party, in respect of a matter to which 
the other party did not turn its mind. It is now possible for a 
contract to be upset in cases, of which Conlon v. Ozolins(ll6) is an 
example, where the party against whom relief is to be granted, is 
entirely innocent and realistically unmistaken, This is a 
significant departure from the approach of the Common Law, which was 
not intended to be altered, and it ignores the 'mutuality' concept 
in respect of operative mistakes, which was referred to by the 
Minister responsible for the Bill. 
Furthermore,the decision limits the effect of section 6(1)(a)(i). 
Previously, this provision would have been of considerable 
importance in cases where realistically, only one party was 
mistaken. Now, it will only need to be invoked in cases in which 
knowledge of the mistake is clearly proven - most other essentially 
unilateral mistake cases will fall within section 6(l)(a)(iii). 
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By enabling relief to be granted against parties who are entirely 
innocent and realistically unmistaken, the decision also jeopardises 
certainty in contracting. Under the Common Law, relief could not be 
ordered against a party unless there was some reason why it would 
not be unjust to do so. For example, that party had known of or 
shared the mistake, or had been partly or wholly to blame for its 
occurrence, or alternatively, if the contract had been ambiguous. 
But now, a contract can be overturned against any party. Where is 
the contractual certainty which, because it was considered so 
important, received special mention by Parliament?(117) 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In the area of contractual mistakes, there is a need for the law to strike 
a balance between the competing interests of the parties involved. The 
interests of the mistaken party in not being held to potentially burdensome 
contractual obligations which were not intended to be undertaken, and the 
interests of the other party in being able to obtain the benefits of a 
contract, which may have been entered into in good faith and without 
knowledge of the existence of any mistake. 
In its favour, the Court of Appeal's decision in Conlon v. Ozolins(ll8) 
allows relief to be given in cases where although the party against whom 
relief would be granted is entirely innocent, the burdens or inequalities 
arising from the mistake are so substantial that a greater injustice could 
be done if some form of relief was not granted. It may be that a judicious 
use of the safeguards provided in section 6(l)(b) and section 7 to prevent 
the wholesale granting of relief, can achieve better results that would 
otherwise have been possible. 
However, it remains apparent that in enabling Mrs Ozotins to receive 
relief, the majority of the Court of Appeal went against the intentions 
of both the Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee and of 
Parliament. Certainly, it was intended that all contractual mistakes cases 
be dealt with in terms of the legislation, so the overruling of 
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McCullough v. McGrath (119) in so far as it was held that the 
Smith v. Hughes(l20) principle operated to prevent a party from raising 
his mistake, was the proper course to take. However, it is equally 
apparent that in Conlon v. Ozolins(l21), which was essentially a 
unilateral mistake case, and was intended to be regarded as such, relief 
was not to be available in the absence of the knowledge of the mistake by 
Mr Conlon. Therefore, contrary to the opinions of the majority, the 
Conlon v. Ozolins(l22) decision was not in accordance with the intentions 
behind the legislation. The judgment to be preferred is the dissent of 
Somers J •• 
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